

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

APR 2 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.75
27 August 1962

ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 27 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy) :

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
Mr. P.M. GEORGE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. L. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir MICHAEL WHRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLÉ

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. REPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the seventy-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In the interest of humanity and of generations as yet unborn, the United States earnestly seeks a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which will ban all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. For over four years we have been patiently conducting extensive scientific research and negotiating for such a treaty and we shall continue to do so. What are we trying to stop? We are trying to stop the destruction of the human race and historical values. If we do not stop testing altogether, we may stop human progress altogether. So let us move forward about our business.

The United States believes that a workable comprehensive test ban treaty is urgently needed. Such an agreement will be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. It will be the foundation for the establishment of the necessary confidence, which must be built upon in order to ensure that other more far-reaching disarmament measures will be concluded and faithfully carried out. Such a treaty can serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. Finally, it will prevent further increases in the radioactive fallout from nuclear tests.

To achieve the workable comprehensive test ban which it seeks the United States has recently made a number of proposals on detection, location and identification in order to break the deadlock which has gripped the test ban negotiations. Each of those proposals has been based upon an intensive study by the United States of each aspect of the issues which has been a major stumbling block in the negotiations -- the detection, the location and the necessary identification of underground nuclear weapon tests.

The results of our studies and evaluations, as I pointed out at our meeting on 14 August (ENDC/PV.69, p.9), have permitted us to make certain proposals with regard to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Those proposals include:

1. acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections;
2. willingness to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

3. a willingness to consider a network of detection stations equipped with various types of up-to-date instrumentation which (a) would involve a number of stations substantially smaller than the number previously proposed, including a smaller number of stations in the Soviet Union, and (b) would involve nationally manned, internationally supervised, inspected and monitored stations instead of a network of internationally manned and operated stations.

Accordingly, on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States, I am now tabling a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the proposals which my delegation has made and which I have just outlined for the Committee.

As I stated to this Committee also on 14 August, these proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty reflect the recent findings of the United States research programme on detection, identification, and location of underground seismic events and an analysis of seismic data produced by the recent United States underground test series (ENDC/45). Also they take into account constructive suggestions by the eight new members of this Conference, including those contained in their memorandum of 16 April (ENDC/28). A reading of the text of the comprehensive treaty now laid before the Committee will show the serious extent to which those suggestions of the eight new members have been taken into account. I should like to ask the Secretariat to circulate this draft treaty as a Conference document.^{1/}

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/58.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The proposed comprehensive treaty provides for the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments. The parties to the treaty would undertake to prevent and prohibit the carrying out of such tests at any place under their jurisdiction or control. They would undertake also to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of such tests anywhere at any time. These obligations would be supervised by an international scientific commission assisted by an international staff and a verification system. Each party would undertake also to co-operate with that commission in carrying out all measures of detection, location, identification and inspection, and in establishing elements of the system. The commission would have general responsibility for the collection of data on, and for the reporting of, all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions and for making positive identification of the nature and origin of such events as necessary.

The draft treaty provides that the commission should consist of fifteen members -- four from the West, four from the Soviet bloc and seven chosen from among parties jointly nominated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would hold permanent membership on the commission.

The international staff would assist the commission by carrying out functions at the headquarters and by manning any international stations which might be set up by the commission in agreement with the parties concerned where that was considered desirable and was mutually acceptable. The staff would also participate in the international supervision, inspection and monitoring of the nationally manned detection stations.

The executive officer of the commission would be responsible for the staff under the direction of the commission. He would select the scientific and technical personnel for the international staff under criteria set forth in the treaty. The verification system would include nationally manned, internationally supervised and monitored detection stations to be constructed at sites which would be agreed upon by the parties to the treaty. The commission would establish the specifications and pay for maintaining, constructing, equipping and training personnel for these nationally manned stations.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In addition, in so far as appropriate, use would be made of a number of national stations already in existence. The parties would assume an obligation to ensure that the system would begin operation at least six months after the entry into force of the treaty. Obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events would be provided for on the basis of carefully defined procedures laid down in the treaty. The executive officer, on behalf of the commission, would indicate which events had been located and remained unidentified after the application of criteria specified in the treaty.

The size of the area in any party's territory which might be inspected in connexion with any unidentified event also would be designated in the treaty. Inspection would take place under an annual quota arrangement for each country -- an agreed maximum per year -- but only if the events met the treaty requirements for eligibility for on-site inspection. Let me be clear: if there were no unidentified events certified by the commission in any year then there would be no on-site inspections.

As I stated at a meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 9 August 1962 (ENDC/SC.1/PV.23, pp. 6-7), after certification of an unidentified event by the commission, the events to be inspected in the Soviet Union, for maximum deterrence, would be selected jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom; and, accordingly, events to be inspected in the United States and the United Kingdom would be selected by the Soviet Union. Unidentified events in other States would also follow a quota arrangement. The objective of on-site inspections would be carried out by teams organized by the commission so as to prevent nationals from any State inspecting events on its own territory. States would assume an obligation to facilitate and to co-operate in any on-site inspection undertaken under the treaty.

A party would have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it determined that the treaty had been violated, or that the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection had not been fulfilled, or that a nuclear explosion had been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty and that explosion jeopardized the withdrawing State's security. Or if an explosion occurred and it was not possible to identify the State conducting the explosion but the explosion jeopardized the withdrawing party's national security, the withdrawing party could request that a conference be called to include all other parties. Withdrawal would not take effect until the passing of a specified time.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The treaty would come into force on a specified date which would be subject to negotiation, thus incorporating the recommendation made by the representative of Mexico on 9 May 1962 (ENDC/PV.34, p.16). Other details are given in the text of the treaty which has now been distributed to the Committee. The details on these and other aspects of the treaty, such as what constitutes a nuclear explosion, must be negotiated.

As I have indicated before, the keynote of this comprehensive treaty is the provision for obligatory on-site inspections which provides that all States have an unconditional, unequivocal "Honest Injun" obligation to facilitate such an on-site inspection. I have presented to this Committee the scientific and technical reasons which underlie the significance of obligatory on-site inspections according to United Kingdom and United States scientists -- and as far as I know this is not disputed by any other scientists; I repeat, it is not disputed by any other scientists -- there will be a substantial number of seismic events each year within the Soviet Union which will be detected by seismic stations but which cannot be identified by seismic means alone. The Soviet delegation does indeed appear to admit that some number of seismic events will remain unidentified after all the data have been reported by the detection stations. The United States-United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty, I submit, provides a reasonable and effective means of dealing with those unidentified events.

The basic question is what type of verification arrangements are most likely to serve as an effective deterrent so that there never will be a violation of the treaty. A treaty containing debatable and arguable provisions is not one which provides effective deterrence. An effective treaty must have provisions for obligatory, objective on-site inspection by the commission in order to provide the necessary assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations and that the treaty, once entered into, will last.

Therefore, in order to deter violations, to detect violations if they occur, to remove doubts about the nature of certain unidentified events, and to make the treaty last and not fall when the first number of unidentified events appear there must be, I submit, a clear-cut unequivocal obligation to accept and facilitate some number of objective on-site inspections per year by the commission. The number of those inspections would assure a State that

(Mr. Dean, United States)

its national security would not be jeopardized. Each side would choose unidentified events for inspection on the territory of the other side but only, as I have said, after such unidentified events had been certified as eligible by the commission according to scientific criteria to be stated in the treaty.

This acceptance of the obligation to facilitate and permit on-site inspection involves no derogation of sovereignty. It is a commitment to be undertaken by a sovereign State just as the obligation not to test is a commitment to be undertaken by a sovereign State.

The carrying out of on-site inspection can, and indeed could be accomplished by the strictly objective teams organized by the Commission without any danger or possibility whatsoever of espionage. We have made numerous suggestions to our Soviet colleagues on how espionage could be absolutely prevented. The United States is prepared to discuss with its Soviet colleagues any detail of inspection in order to avoid any problems that the Soviet Union believes might exist regarding this question of espionage.

I have indicated what, in the United States view, are the essential requirements for a comprehensive treaty. But it takes more than proposals by one side alone to get our negotiations moving, for effective negotiations require the work of more than one party. It is a source of great regret to my Government that the Soviet Union has apparently determined to meet these new, and I believe constructive, United Kingdom and United States proposals with a straight-arm rebuff, to insist that we have not changed our old positions, and to continue as a result to keep our negotiations stalled on dead centre.

My Government, nevertheless, earnestly desires to begin the job of meaningful disarmament and to end the arms race. To do so we are pledged in the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) to seek the widest possible area of agreement which can be achieved at the earliest possible time. My Government is not content in this search for agreement to leave any area unexplored or any worth-while idea unproposed.

So the United States, while continuing to negotiate urgently and in any appropriate forum for a comprehensive treaty, in the interests of all humanity, would nevertheless be prepared in an effort to reach the widest

possible area of agreement, in the soonest possible time, to agree to a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The United States believes that such a partial treaty would represent a substantial positive gain for society.

First, such a treaty would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race. Under such a ban, for example, it would not be possible to explore further the interaction of nuclear weapons with the ionosphere or the atmosphere. Operational proof testing of entire weapons systems would be precluded. Testing of weapons to learn how they could be used in battlefield situations would be denied nuclear Powers. Development of ever larger yield warheads for missiles would be stopped, or at least much inhibited.

Second, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans would have an effect on the countries that are about to enter the nuclear arms race. Almost all areas of weapons development and technology, particularly those areas I have just discussed, would be made more difficult for them if these nations became parties to such a treaty. Consequently, a significant portion of the nuclear arms race can be prevented from spreading to other countries if, as we sincerely hope, the Soviet Union joins with us in accepting such a treaty.

Third, such a treaty would stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, space, and the oceans. Much argument has taken place on the extent to which radioactive fallout does or does not represent a danger. But we do know that at the very least fallout is not desirable. We also know that if the testing continues in these environments at an accelerated pace, fallout will increase. A definite end to further increases in radioactive fallout is a significant by-product of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

A proposal for a limited test ban treaty has been offered in the past by the United States. President Eisenhower made a proposal for an atmospheric treaty on 13 April 1959 (GEN/DNT/53, pp. 1,2) to Chairman Khrushchev, and it was rejected. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan also proposed a limited treaty on 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120). Unfortunately, they met with rejection from the Soviet Union.

It is now our earnest hope, in the interest of all mankind, that this proposal for a partial treaty will meet with the immediate and responsive

approval of the Soviet Government and that we can get on with the job of drafting an agreement which will break the deadlock in which we find ourselves.

This proposal has also been discussed on several occasions by many of the representatives at this Conference. The proposal was first mentioned at this resumed session by the representative of Brazil when he said on 25 July:

"It has been implied that a nuclear test ban is difficult to attain because the great Powers cannot or do not wish to agree on the intricate question of control, a problem which is based on confidence. It is well known, however, that the main divergencies and discrepancies do lie in the problems of detection and identification of underground tests, as the international control required for atmospheric and outer space tests does not appear to present so many insurmountable difficulties. Why, then, not concentrate our efforts on this question of atmospheric and outer space tests which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and nerves?" (ENDC/PV.61, p.36)

The representative of Mexico supported this proposal on 30 July, when he said:

"... we now think it might be possible to go back to the idea of ending atmospheric tests while continuing to negotiate on underground tests, if the present differences about the technical difficulties of detection and identification and the form of adequate control continue to hold up the framing of a treaty." (ENDC/PV.63, p.27)

Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden also supported this approach when she stated on 1 August:

"If such an undertaking were restricted, as an initial measure, to atmospheric and outer space tests -- plus, I hope, underwater tests -- a treaty would be easy to draft and the hopes of the tormented world would mount and confidence would begin to be felt." (ENDC/PV.64, p.7)

Support for an atmospheric test ban treaty was also voiced by the representative of Nigeria, Foreign Minister Wachuku, when he said on 23 March:

"My delegation demands that every effort should be made to conclude an agreement to stop nuclear explosions in the atmosphere." (ENDC/PV.8, p.9)

The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fattah Hassan, told us of his delegation's interest in an approach to a ban on such tests. On 13 June he said:

"Since less than a year ago it was possible for one party and the other to offer a test ban treaty banning atmospheric tests, with no additional international obligatory controls required, and relegating the solution of the more thorny, less important underground tests to some future date, would it not again prove possible for both parties to give a little here and a little there and arrive at a settlement which might embody the desires, and indeed the spirit, of the offers of both parties already referred to?" (ENDC/PV.55, p.34)

A proposal to ban tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water was supported by the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Alamayehu, in his interesting first address to this Committee on 3 August. He stated that he strongly supported a proposal of Mexico, Brazil and Sweden (ENDC/PV.65, p.13).

The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, voiced his support for the proposals of the delegations of Mexico and Brazil for a limited treaty, when he said at the same meeting:

"We believe that the concessions and sacrifices would be worth while if they helped to put us on the road leading to a complete test ban. We accordingly support both those proposals, and commend them to the nuclear Sub-Committee." (Ibid., p.16).

In addition, support for such an approach in this Conference to the problem came from the delegation of India. The Defence Minister of India, M. Krishna Menon, told the Committee on 20 March, at our fifth plenary meeting:

"The main explosions we are worried about at the moment are explosions in the atmosphere and the biosphere." (ENDC/PV.5, p.39)

Thus India too would, I feel sure, concur with us that even partial agreement banning tests in these environments would be a positive and constructive step forward.

In sum, therefore, it seems to us that there is a wide measure of agreement among the eight new members of this Committee that, if a comprehensive test ban treaty cannot be achieved in the near future, efforts should be made to reach agreement on a cessation of tests in those environments acceptable to all the States concerned.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I also wish to note in this connexion the constructive suggestion regarding a limited treaty made by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Italy, at our seventieth meeting, as recorded on page 20 of document ENDC/PV.70.

My Government and the United Kingdom Government have for a long time been studying such a limited proposal, and I am now, on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom, submitting a draft treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. I should like to ask the Secretariat to circulate this treaty as a Conference document.^{2/}

Briefly, this partial treaty would:

ban nuclear weapon tests in or above the atmosphere and in territorial waters or high seas;

bind the signatories to refrain from encouraging or participating in such nuclear explosions by any other State;

permit explosions proscribed in the treaty for peaceful purposes under conditions specified in the treaty;

not require any international verification machinery;

provide a cut-off date for testing; and,

contain provision for withdrawal, after notice had been given, if a party deemed the treaty had been violated or that a State not a party to the treaty had tested and if the party also deemed this jeopardized its national security.

Let me now discuss the essential features of this proposed partial treaty.

The parties would undertake an obligation to prohibit and prevent nuclear weapon test explosions in any place under their jurisdiction and control in or above the atmosphere, in territorial waters or on the high seas or in any other environment if radioactive debris would be produced outside the territorial limits of the State in which such tests were conducted.

Parties would also be under an obligation to refrain from participating in or encouraging prohibited nuclear weapon test explosions by any other State.

The parties would be allowed to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes in environments proscribed by the treaty with the unanimous consent of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union or, if required, under conditions in which the nuclear device was open to internal inspection.

^{2/} Circulated as document ENDC/59.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

A party would have the right to withdraw if the treaty had been violated by another party, if a State not a party to the treaty had tested nuclear weapons and that was deemed to be a threat to the party's national security, or if nuclear weapon tests occurred which either violated the treaty or jeopardized the withdrawing party's national security and it was not possible to identify the State responsible. Before a State could withdraw it would have to request that a conference of all parties be called, at which it would present its reasons for withdrawal. The withdrawal could take effect only after a period of sixty days from the submission of a notice of withdrawal.

Those provisions are all that would be basically necessary for a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. My Government is prepared to sign such a treaty without the addition of any international verification machinery, and it is my understanding that that is also the position of the United Kingdom. That position is consistent with the position taken by the United States throughout this Conference -- namely, that verification measures should be related to the needs of the parties and to the degree of risk to them from possible clandestine violations.

The United States suggests that in any limited agreement, as in a comprehensive test ban treaty, there be a cut-off date for testing. All parties would thus be under notice regarding the date when testing proscribed by the treaty would end. That idea was recommended by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, on 9 May; at the thirty fourth meeting of this Committee he said:

"... it is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every day to draw up an agreement fixing now -- I repeat, now -- the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion of the series of explosions already begun and before the beginning of the answering series announced by the Soviet Union."

- I might interpolate that, as the Committee knows, that series of tests in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union has begun and is continuing -

"The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty, because it is dangerous to wait until both series of tests are finished before negotiating an effective agreement that will put a stop to the nuclear arms race." (ENDC/PV.34, p.16)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In the past it has been suggested that a proposal for a partial ban on tests should be accompanied by a moratorium on underground testing. Such a proposal, of course, goes contrary to the reasons for which such a partial ban is proposed. The reason for which my Government reluctantly chose to consider a partial ban -- in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space -- was the seemingly adamant refusal of the Soviet Union to accept a reasonable number of obligatory on-site inspections of unidentified events certified by the commission, so that apparently, at least at the present time, no satisfactory comprehensive test ban agreement could be reached. Regrettably as that situation is -- and it is indeed regrettable -- we have accepted the suggestion that we continue to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty but accept now a partial ban for the moment. But to make agreement on a partial ban contingent upon a moratorium with respect to underground tests would merely revive the issues which we have asked be reserved for solution as part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Why cannot the United States accept a moratorium on underground tests? It is because, as we have made clear, we believe testing in that environment must cease under adequate and effective international control. It is not necessary to recall here the unfortunate experience the United States had last autumn when the Soviet Union began to test, despite the solemn pledge to the contrary by Chairman Khrushchev in January 1960 -- to be precise, on 14 January 1960 -- and during a period when the United States not only did not test but, with the United Kingdom, had made and was making far-reaching and constructive proposals here in Geneva designed to produce agreement. Indeed, we thought we had cleared away the last remaining vestige of reason why the Soviet Union would not sign such a treaty on the evening of 30 August, only to hear the announcement that night that the Soviet Union was going to resume tests.

The United States wishes to make it abundantly clear that no party is precluded under any test ban treaty from conducting laboratory tests and other work preparatory to tests. We intend to keep ourselves in readiness, and we note that in the past few weeks the Soviet Union has started another series of tests of nuclear weapons, including weapons the equivalent of several million tons of explosive power, and as I have said those tests in the atmosphere are continuing.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I submit that the position of the United States on the banning of nuclear weapon tests is reasonable and forthcoming. Basically, we wish to ban all nuclear tests in all environments under a treaty with effective international verification, including obligatory, objective on-site inspection. We have moved in many ways to new positions based on sound scientific research. In co-operation with the United Kingdom we have done our level best to reach agreement, and I submit that we have not been stubborn or obstinate, unyielding or unmoving. For its part, the United States is prepared to accept such a comprehensive treaty at any time if the Soviet Union will accept a detection, location, identification and inspection system which is related to the degree of risk involved and is therefore adequate for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The United States earnestly hopes that the discontinuance of tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water will stimulate progress towards an early agreement on an effective treaty banning tests in all environments. To further that objective, the United States pledges itself to continue negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of urgency and to continue its research efforts concerning the detection and identification of underground nuclear weapons tests. The United States will continue to make public, as it did on 7 July 1962 in document ENDC/45, the results of any research which may be helpful in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to offer its scientists for consultation as it did here at Geneva.

In conclusion, let me make clear and explicit what the United States and the United Kingdom are today proposing. We are submitting a new comprehensive treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States for the banning of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. This comprehensive treaty has taken into account recent advances in research on the detection, location, and identification of nuclear weapons tests. The proposed comprehensive treaty contains reasonable and effective measures on inspection to assure that all parties can have confidence that the treaty is being observed.

The details of the comprehensive treaty are details that should and must be discussed so that they meet the interests and requirements of all parties. The United States is prepared to continue working for such a comprehensive treaty without interruption and with a sense of urgency and dedication. We will bring our scientists back to Geneva if that will further negotiations.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We are submitting also on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States a new treaty for the banning of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans. This treaty requires an international verification machinery. It could and indeed should be accepted at the earliest possible date. There are no stumbling blocks which should stand in the way of its adoption by the nuclear Powers represented at this Conference.

We, the nuclear Powers, have the capacity to protect or to destroy the peoples of all countries. We have, therefore, a compelling and an urgent responsibility to strive unceasingly to resolve our differences and to present to the world an effective agreement which can be signed just as soon as possible to ban all nuclear weapons tests. But if we cannot do that immediately then, I submit with regret, a partial treaty is better than none at all. Let us not be deterred from accepting the good because we cannot at this time accomplish the best. At the same time we must demonstrate by our continued and conscientious efforts that more comprehensive agreement will soon be forthcoming.

The United States and the United Kingdom, in presenting these draft treaties, have made a determined, far-reaching and epochal step towards reaching agreement in the interest of all mankind. We stand ready to negotiate on these draft treaties. We now respectfully request the Soviet Union to take an equally far-reaching step so that real and lasting progress will be achieved.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I suppose there is not one of us around this table, not one delegation or one representative, who is not conscious of the responsibilities which we bear in this Conference not only to our own countries but to the world. We have all of us been sent here to negotiate agreements acceptable not only to our own Governments but to the whole world community, both on general and complete disarmament and, in the same field, on nuclear weapon tests. In the same way, those of us from countries with nuclear capabilities have an especial responsibility to resolve our differences. I do not believe that there is one of us who would disagree with what the representative of Mexico said at our thirty-fourth meeting, namely that nuclear weapons testing is "the most serious form of rearmament" (ENDC/PV.34, p.18) and consequently that a cessation of the most serious form of rearmament is in fact a direct contribution to disarmament.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

This morning I want to follow up the important speech which we have just heard from our United States colleague on the question of a nuclear weapons test ban. The United Kingdom believes that a nuclear weapons test ban is the key to disarmament. I said in my speech on 14 August that the elements of an agreement do in fact now exist (ENDC/PV.69, p. 33); if there can be shown equal good will on both sides those elements could be expressed in a signed treaty, and that could be done before the seventeenth session of the General Assembly opens on 18 September.

In his intervention on 20 August, my colleague Sir Michael Wright said (ENDC/PV.72, p. 5) that the basic difference which separates the two sides on this question has been narrowed down to a gap which it ought not to be beyond the resources of diplomacy to bridge. There are, as we all know, four environments in which nuclear weapons tests can be conducted; in the earth's atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground. The only divergence between the two sides is in just one of those four environments, namely the underground environment; and in that environment it is a question of how to deal with a residue of events about which science cannot yet establish the facts without on-site inspection. I repeat that -- science cannot establish the facts as far as we know at the present time.

Of those four environments there is one, the atmospheric environment, which presents a problem completely different from the problems of the other three environments -- the problem of the risk to health created by radioactive fall-out. Tests underground do not present that problem; tests under water do not present that problem; only tests in the atmosphere, and possibly above it as well.

My Government believes that the right answer, not only for our own people but for all the people of the world, lies in a treaty which would ban for all time, with a minimum of verification of observance, tests in all four environments. We believe it is urgent that such a treaty should be signed. If it is not signed within a short period, if the countries now conducting nuclear tests do not agree to stop doing so, more and more countries will say that their national security will be endangered if they do not conduct nuclear weapon tests also. We might have a year or two, we might have less, before that will happen. I do not know. But I do say that no nuclear power should accept the responsibility for delaying an agreement by one month, or even by one day, if the means of agreement, in fact, lie open to us.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The only basic difference that apparently stands between the world and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty today is the difference between the Soviet thesis of no obligatory on-site inspections and a Western offer to discuss an annual figure of such inspections substantially below the 12 to 20 previously offered. We say, and my delegation believes, that the fate of mankind may be involved in this issue. In those circumstances surely it is not too much to ask our Soviet colleagues to accept this very minimal amount of obligatory on-site inspection which, on our best scientific information, we feel bound still to ask for at the present time. Or, if they claim that that is unnecessary, I do beg them to bring forward their new scientific knowledge so that we may share it with them, and thus enable us to agree with them that obligatory on-site inspection is no longer necessary to identify any of these events. We in the West are working as hard as we can to achieve such a position now, and no one will be more pleased than we if and when we can say that we are satisfied that we can not only detect and locate but also identify all those presently remaining suspicious and significant events. But until we are so satisfied, and unless the Soviet Union is willing to help us forward in this work, we do not think it unreasonable to ask it to do what, even up to twelve months ago, it still expressed itself as ready and willing to do, namely, to undertake a small quota of obligatory on-site inspections.

As we have just heard in the previous speech, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly are tabling for the consideration of this Conference two alternative draft treaty texts (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59). We are prepared to sign either of them today as it stands. But we are equally prepared to negotiate upon either of them.

These alternative texts represent what I believe to be the sixteenth attempt by the United States and United Kingdom since March 1961 to reach an agreement by putting forward new and practical compromise proposals to meet the constantly changing wishes of the Soviet Union. I repeat, this is our sixteenth new offer. In each case up till now the Soviet representative at the Conference table has made one or other of three comments. He has either said that the new offer is not new; or he has said that it is an ultimatum; or he has said that the international circumstances have changed and that the attitude of the Soviet Union is now harder than its previous attitude. I hope very much we shall not get such a response today. Let me reassure Mr. Kuznetsov at once. Both these offers are new offers, which go substantially further to

meet the Soviet Union than previous offers. Neither of these offers is an ultimatum; neither offer is on the basis of "take it or leave it"; both offers are negotiable. As for the international situation, I suppose the principle change in recent months has been the signature of the Laos agreement. At least to my country, the conclusion of a compromise agreement over Laos appears to be an argument for reaching further compromise agreements. I hope very much that our Soviet colleague will agree and will respond in the same sense.

The United States representative has already given an outline of the two new and alternative Western draft treaty offers. I have already said that the United Kingdom associates itself with these offers and that both are negotiable. Of the two forms of agreement the United Kingdom prefers a comprehensive agreement. The present draft offer purposely leaves blank the figures for a quota of inspections and for numbers of detection posts. That is to emphasize that those matters are negotiable. We propose no hard and fast plan, no cut and dried figures. We have already said that on a quota of inspections we are prepared to discuss a figure that is less than the 12 to 20 previously proposed if the Soviet Government, for its part, would come up from the figure of zero. If the Soviet Union, or indeed, any other country, can show us how to make instruments which will identify all underground events, we are prepared here and now to say there need be no on-site inspection. We are prepared further to say that on the basis of additional international research we believe that even the small residue of unidentified underground events which science cannot yet identify without on-site inspection will be progressively reduced, we hope to vanishing point. In the intervening period before this happens it would, of course, be possible to propose that the international scientific commission should have the right of asking for an inspection of all of those unidentified events, and that if a signatory State were to refuse such a request that would constitute a breach of the treaty. We know that the Soviet Union does not like the idea of on-site inspections. We are perfectly prepared ourselves for any number of on-site inspections and, frankly, we still do not understand the Soviet objections. We put up no such barrier to an adequately verified comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. But, to take account of Soviet views, we suggest that instead of every unidentified event being liable to inspection by an international commission, only a small number would be so liable. If, however, this is to be

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

the answer, and there is to be only a quota of inspections, then if inspection is to maintain its purpose -- which, after all, is of deterrent value -- the choice out of events detected and located by instruments and declared by the international commission as otherwise unidentifiable should, in our view, rest with the other side. After all, that is in fact what the Soviet Government proposed in 1959, a proposal which the West then accepted. It is a Soviet proposal which we accepted then and which we maintain now.

The other main points for a comprehensive treaty are, first, the character of the detection posts, and second, the relationship between detection posts and an international scientific commission. Sir Michael Wright dealt with the first point in his intervention at our seventy-second meeting. He underlined that under the Western proposals of April 1961 (ENDC/9) there would have been 19 detection posts in the Soviet Union manned two-thirds by foreigners -- in other words, 380 foreign nationals operating detection posts in the Soviet Union. He went on to say that under the new Western proposals there would be no foreign nationals operating detection posts in the Soviet Union. That is reflected in our draft proposals submitted today and it is indeed a very large step forward.

On the question of the relationship between detection posts and an international scientific commission, I do not think that I can do better than to repeat what I said at the twenty-third meeting of the Sub-Committee on 9 August:

"On the precise relations between the international commission and national detection posts necessary to ensure the requisite high degree of accuracy and uniformity I think it should be possible to bring the positions of the two sides closer together. As far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned we naturally want to look at that and to discuss the problem but our position is that the degree of supervision should be no more than is clearly shown to be necessary to ensure that results from a station play their part in providing an adequate world-wide coverage on which the international commission would feel fully able to rely. We want to explore this matter. We should like, with the assistance of our scientists and those of other delegations, to take into account in this context the suggestions which were made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at the sixty-fourth plenary meeting held on 1 August." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, pp.16-17)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Our new position marks a big advance in principle. As I have said, we agree that detection posts can be operated by home country nationals. Next, there will be many fewer detection posts. It would be a matter for negotiation and agreement how many there would be altogether if we reckon in the help which existing university-type and other posts could give. Even counting those, a figure has been mentioned in the neighbourhood of eighty. But if the most up-to-date instruments -- seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic and so on -- could be grouped together at particular posts, there might perhaps be less than half that number of principal or core or key detection posts for the whole world. Only a handful of those key stations might have to be located in the United States or in the Soviet Union, operated, as I have said, by home country nationals. So the numbers are now small. But it would certainly be necessary that at least these principal or core or key posts should operate, with the most up-to-date scientific instruments, to common standards of efficiency and accuracy. The national security of signatory States would depend upon the reliance which they could place upon the effective operation of those posts. Whose responsibility would it be to see that those standards were maintained throughout the essential elements of the system? It could hardly be the responsibility of any single country since it is a matter of the efficiency of the system as a whole. The responsibility, I think, could only rest upon the international scientific commission; and that certainly was how I understood the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) to envisage it. The security of all of us would rest upon the efficiency of the supervision of the international scientific commission, but it would be its supervision and not ours -- not the supervision of the United Kingdom, not the supervision of the United States, not the supervision of the Soviet Union, but the supervision of the international commission. I cannot believe that this question is not negotiable without undue difficulty. My own Government has an open mind upon it and is willing to discuss any points of difficulty that may arise.

The United Kingdom believes that a comprehensive treaty, which would put an end to all tests in all environments, is the right answer. The text submitted today contains our suggestions, drawn up in the light of the new data, of the form which such a treaty might take. This agreement is built

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

upon and takes account of the constructive suggestions of the eight new members and of their memorandum of 16 April. It accepts the international commission as the authoritative body. It accepts the idea of a system based on national detection posts.

On the third main principle, that of on-site inspection, the Soviet representative will no doubt argue again, as he has argued before, that the memorandum does not provide for obligatory on-site inspection, and that therefore our treaty text goes beyond the memorandum in this. I do not want to go through this argument again today. We have had it so many times both in the Sub-Committee and in the plenary meetings, and all representatives are well aware of the arguments which have been put forward on both sides. I would only say that I do not accept the Soviet interpretation and that, in my view, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum build up a position where on-site inspection must follow in every disputed event if full co-operation is to be conceded; and, if full co-operation is not given, then the terms of the memorandum are not being complied with.

I raise this now only because I sometimes wonder if the representative of the Soviet Union realizes that strict compliance with the memorandum would result in far more on-site inspections than the West is now asking for. The memorandum speaks of no quota. It deals in paragraph 4 with any suspicious or significant event. But if it says "any", then I presume that this must be "every" such event and, if the parties to the treaty do not give full co-operation in regard to each of these, then the other parties would presumably be free to abrogate the treaty.

The facts, which have been made available to members of this Committee in private talks by United States and United Kingdom scientists, lead us to think that there will remain something more than fifty unidentified events a year in, for example, the Soviet Union. Those events will be significant. They will not have been identified. They will be events of the type which might be nuclear, and all of them, under the terms of the memorandum, will be eligible for inspection.

Therefore, in our new draft we are not calling for more inspection than the eight-Power memorandum, but for less. We do ask, however, that the obligation be clearly and unequivocally accepted by all the parties in advance, and that we consider to be essential if the treaty is to mean anything at all.

I would emphasize also that in this draft we have sought to embody the suggestion of the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.34, pp.16-17), namely, that if, for example, the treaty were signed on 1 September, all nuclear weapon testing by signatories would cease from some future date which might, for example, be 1 January or 1 March next, or whatever date would be agreed. That would give time for any country to conduct any nuclear weapons tests which, however regrettably, it might feel that its national security required. Thus no country would be asked to agree to a termination date for all nuclear testing which would, in its view, compromise its national security.

This, then, is our new comprehensive draft treaty, which we are ready and anxious to discuss and negotiate on and which embodies our latest scientific information.

Why, therefore, do we put forward also an additional, or rather an alternative, text of a more limited nature? We do so because we are determined to achieve a test ban treaty if it is in any way possible, and if we cannot at once secure a comprehensive treaty then, we say, let us obtain agreement in such environments as we can agree on, while at the same time we continue to work out with the Soviet Union the matters that still divide us in regard to underground tests. And so we offer our alternative. And here again this alternative does mark a very big step forward.

This is the third time the West has offered an agreement on atmospheric tests. As our United States colleague reminded us, the first one was on 13 April, 1959 (GEN/DNT/53, pp.1,2). The United States and the United Kingdom Governments then said they were prepared to reach agreement to end all nuclear weapons tests as soon as the proper control mechanisms and procedures could be agreed. They suggested that, if agreement on those mechanisms and proper controls could not be reached immediately, we should start by agreeing to suspend tests in the atmosphere and under water under the control available. That proposal was turned down by the Soviet Union. On 3 September last year the United States and the United Kingdom again made an offer (GEN/DNT/120) in this field but it was of a different character. We proposed that the three Governments should agree immediately not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout. Our Governments said that their aim in that proposal was to protect mankind from the increasing

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

hazards from atmospheric pollution and to contribute to the reduction of international tensions. They said with regard to atmospheric testing they were prepared to rely on existing means of detection and were not suggesting additional controls. That offer was rejected by Chairman Khrushchev five days later, and thereafter it lapsed.

Today the United States and the United Kingdom have submitted a draft text which is now before the Committee, and this text would in fact go further. It proposes an agreement to put an end for all time to nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, without any form of on-site inspection over the territory of a country in which an unidentified event of this nature might have occurred in these environments.

By making this offer the United States and the United Kingdom together are dropping the requirement, which had in fact been agreed to by the Soviet Union and had been embodied in the Western offer of April 1961, that there should be special aircraft sampling flights over the territory of the country concerned in the case of an unidentified event in the atmosphere over the territory of that country. We are now satisfied that an adequate check for radioactive fallout in the case of a suspected atmospheric test could be provided by aircraft sampling flights outside the air space of the country concerned. We should have no objection to aircraft sampling flights over our own territories; but, as a concession to the Soviet Union, and, I submit, a far-reaching concession, we are prepared to eliminate any such requirement from the system. So I confirm that the United Kingdom is prepared to sign such a treaty without any international verification machinery.

I must make it clear, however, that in view of the action of the Soviet Union in breaking, at the beginning of September 1961, the three-year suspension of nuclear weapons testing by the three negotiating Powers, and breaking it in the middle of negotiations without consultation with its partners in negotiation, the United Kingdom, like the United States, could not agree to an unpoliced and uncontrolled moratorium in the underground environment. We have a saying in Britain, "Once bitten, twice shy" and the fault does not lie with the bitten but with the biter.

If the Soviet Union wishes for an agreement covering all environments, our new proposals are on the table. If, while we continue negotiation on

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

a comprehensive treaty and continue scientific research, the Soviet Union will agree to a treaty with no on-site inspection banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, at high altitude and under water, our proposals are also on the table. We have been urged by the eight new members of the Conference, and by others, to explore a solution of this kind. Both proposals are negotiable; neither proposal is an ultimatum; both proposals are new; and we are not only ready but anxious to sign either proposal or a negotiated version of it before the forthcoming recess.

May I conclude what I had to say this morning by calling to the attention of my colleagues a joint statement by my Prime Minister and by President Kennedy which has been released in our respective countries at 11 o'clock this morning. I should like to read it into the record. The statement is as follows:

"A guaranteed end to all nuclear testing in all environments is a fundamental objective of the free world. We are deeply convinced that the achievement of this objective would serve our best national interests and the national interests of all the nations of the world.

"In recent weeks the United States and the United Kingdom have renewed their efforts at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to reach this goal. Based on the latest scientific findings of our research programme, we have put forward proposals in the strong hope of obtaining prompt agreement on this crucial issue.

"As a further step in the direction of this long-sought-after goal, the United States and the United Kingdom have instructed their representatives at Geneva to present today to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee a draft treaty containing proposals for an end to all nuclear testing in all environments as well as an alternative draft treaty providing for an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. We both believe the arrangements we have outlined in these documents for ensuring compliance with the terms of the agreement -- whether comprehensive or limited -- are sound and reasonable, providing, as they do, the necessary guarantees for our own security and the security of all nations which might become parties to either agreement. We wish to make clear the strong preference of the United States and the United Kingdom for prompt action on the first of them, namely, the

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

comprehensive treaty. However, we are also prepared to conclude an early agreement on the basis of the second document, that covering a more limited field, if this represents the widest area of agreement possible at this time.

"Unlike a ban on testing in all environments, including underground, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space can be effectively verified without on-site inspections. Such a treaty would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race as it is represented by testing to develop weapons technology. It would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. It would free mankind from the dangers and fear of radioactive fallout. Furthermore, agreement on such a treaty might be a first step toward an agreement banning testing in all environments.

"The United States and the United Kingdom cannot emphasize too strongly the urgency we attach to the problem of ending all nuclear testing once and for all. For the safety and security of all of us, this deadly competition must be halted and we, again, urge the Soviet Government to join with us in meaningful action to make this necessity a reality."

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): As Chairman of this meeting I feel it my duty to thank the United States and United Kingdom delegations for the important contribution which they have made to the work of the conference by placing on our table this morning their alternative drafts for a nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59). This contribution comes at a time when, with the end of our second session approaching, we are more than ever conscious of the increasing urgency of our task and of the necessity of making a fresh effort to submit to the United Nations General Assembly a concrete result of our proceedings. As the General Assembly approaches, our responsibility is particularly great in the matter of nuclear tests and above all with regard to the tests capable of jeopardizing the physical well-being and the integrity of mankind. The whole world expects us to reach an agreement, at least on so important, so serious and so dangerous a matter as this. I am sure that the new specific proposals which we have

(The Chairman, Italy)

received this morning will be considered without delay and with the greatest care by the nuclear Sub-Committee, which is to meet tomorrow, and later by the full Committee, and I hope that these proposals will at last open the way to the conclusion of a treaty in conformity with the wishes of us all.

Speaking now as the representative of Italy, I should like to state that the documents submitted to the Conference this morning by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations are of quite exceptional importance; they should indeed open the way to rapid and specific agreement at least on the prohibition of those tests which constitute the greatest danger to the well-being and integrity of the human race.

These proposals are a source of special satisfaction to the Italian delegation because we recently expressed the hope that our Conference would explore also the possibility of a limited agreement if an agreement for the banning of all tests was for the moment rendered impossible by Soviet intransigence on the question of control. Today's proposals prove once again that the Western delegations, united in spirit and intentions, are making every possible effort to rid the world of the terrible threat of the nuclear arms race. I do not doubt that these proposals will receive the support of the delegations of the non-aligned countries which have already shown so much good will and which have likewise expressed on many occasions the desire to achieve a limited agreement if a full agreement should not yet be possible.

It is now for the Soviet Union to give its response, and I hope that this time it will think carefully before opposing an agreement which, even though limited, would have immense practical and political significance. If it did so, it would assume a striking and terrible responsibility towards all the peoples of the world.

I now resume the discussion of item 5(b) on our agenda.

Our meeting of 24 August, at which we heard a number of interesting speeches, was marked by two statements which reflect very different approaches to our problems and very different methods of negotiation.

First, there was the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, (ENDC/PV.74; pp.42 et seq) who, feeling that item 5(b) had been exhaustively discussed, went on to a constructive study of the next item on our agenda, sub-paragraph 5(c) of document ENDC/52. He gave us objective,

(The Chairman, Italy)

detailed and documented explanations of the United States proposals on conventional armaments, and these proposals will form a basis for our discussions.

The Committee then heard a long and vehement statement by the Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov (*ibid.*, p.21 et seq.). The Soviet representative not only failed to proceed to the next items on our agenda, but repeated at length all the oldest and most out-of-date arguments of the Soviet case. I shall certainly not follow his example, nor shall I reiterate all the reasons for which the Western Powers are unable to accept articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2). These reasons were given very fully by my colleagues of the Western delegations and, indeed, by myself at previous meetings.

There are, however, some points in Mr. Kuznetsov's speech which I cannot pass over in silence. Presenting once again the Soviet proposals for the abolition of bases during the first stage, Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"As you see, these are not new plans; they are for carrying out the aggressive designs of the United States mainly by making use of its European allies in NATO, while remaining as far as possible on the sidelines, and untouched". (ENDC/PV.74, p. 25)

And proceeding, he said:

"In these circumstances, the danger of a retaliatory blow by the peace-loving States that had been attached would involve mainly the European allies of the United States, those countries on whose territories the United States military bases are located and from which aggression is being planned. Is this not what Washington wants?"

(ibid.)

A little later, Mr. Kuznetsov added:

"The refusal to dismantle foreign military bases on alien territory in the first or even the second stage of general and complete disarmament, unmasks the United States completely". (ibid.)

I am sorry to have to quote these statements of the Soviet representative who, on the one hand, shows complete misunderstanding of Western intentions and, on the other, is naïvely attempting to separate the European countries from their American ally.

I have spoken several time in this Conference on the subject of bases and, most recently, at our sixty-third meeting (ENDC/PV.63, pp. 21-22). However, I should like to assure the Soviet delegation once again that the Western countries have no offensive intentions against anybody. It is, on the contrary, in face of the threat from the East, of which we have again seen regrettable evidence during the last few days, that the countries of Western Europe have linked their forces with those of their American ally in order to protect the free and peaceful development of their peoples without endangering the peaceful development of others.

As representative of the only Western country on the European continent present at this Conference, I feel justified in repeating that we all desire that our security should be assured by total disarmament in a peaceful world. But we should indeed be blind if we agreed to give up our alliance and separate from our American friends before the process of disarmament had restored true confidence in the intentions of our Eastern neighbours.

We want by serious and genuine negotiations to promote the speedy restoration of this confidence through the conclusion of a treaty of general and complete disarmament. We are sorry therefore to say that speeches like that of Mr. Kuznetsov on 24 August only hold up the progress of our work and take us further from, not nearer to, our goal. It is not by endlessly repeating baseless and deceptive arguments that he will succeed in getting the delegations here to think they are true.

In addition, Mr. Kuznetsov's speech seemed to throw doubt on certain principles of control on which we had hoped that an identity of views had been reached. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"The only correct way is to seek agreement on the substance of the disarmament measures and, as and when such agreement is reached, to work out the appropriate control measures." (ENDC/PV.74, p.21)

He then went on to say:

"I thought that in conformity with the agreed principles we had long ago reached agreement on the fact that disarmament and control should go hand in hand and that they should constitute what one might call an indissoluble tandem. It is clear that one cannot accept a disarmament measure without knowing how it is to be verified. In the same way, a control measure without a corresponding measure of disarmament would have no sense."

That was clear, that was accepted by everybody. Mr. Kuznetsov now seems to call this principle into question and to dissociate control from disarmament. Perhaps he is doing this in an attempt to disguise the weakness of the Soviet proposals concerning the alleged 100 per cent control of the abolition of nuclear vehicles. At previous meetings, the Italian delegation had suggested measures on this point which would have enabled us fully to understand the Soviet ideas, for these appeared obscure. It had asked the Soviet delegation to submit to the Conference a working document clarifying its ideas on the measures of control envisaged in connexion with articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of its draft treaty. Such a document, in the Italian delegation's view, might have helped us at last to understand the meaning of the oft-repeated Soviet statement that the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles would be subjected to 100 per cent verification.

I had added that, if the Soviet delegation did not wish to submit such a document, the Secretariat might have been asked to prepare for the Conference a document containing the most important extracts from the Soviet statements on the question of control. This document, too, might have made it easier to examine in detail the Soviet point of view. At our sixty-eighth meeting, the Soviet delegation completely ignored my first request; with regard to the second it stated that the Italian delegation could very well have prepared such a paper itself without burdening the Secretariat. This is certainly feasible, for I can assure the Soviet delegation that we have always followed its statements with the greatest attention and studied the records with the greatest care. But what we thought would be useful would be to have an official document, which would be authoritative as a document of the Conference. I think that the existence of such a document would be to the advantage of the Soviet delegation, but naturally it is for that delegation to judge.

For the present the Soviet delegation has preferred to continue to give us verbal explanations. These have made matters no clearer for us and have not allayed our doubts; on the contrary, they have only confirmed them.

The Italian delegation has always said: first, in pursuance of the principle that control must keep pace with disarmament, total disarmament measures such as the abolition of vehicles demand total control; secondly, the Soviet Union's proposals to include total and partial disarmament measures in the same stage makes the application of control practically impossible.

(The Chairman, Italy)

From the statements of Mr. Zorin and Mr. Kuznetsov it is evident that the reason why the Soviet delegation sees no difficulty in mingling total control and partial control in the same disarmament stage is the following: the Soviet delegation does not in reality accept control sufficient for the total abolition of the vehicles, while at the same time asserting that it accepts 100 per cent control. This alleged 100 per cent control is only control of eliminated quantities of certain products which have been declared by the governments concerned - nothing more. The controllers would not have the right to investigate the possible existence of hidden depots or clandestine manufacture. In other words, the Soviet delegation has made no change in the position on control which it adopted several years ago.

At this point in our debate, when we are concluding the discussion of item 5(b), it remains quite clear that the Soviet delegation, in proposing the total abolition of vehicles, is suggesting a measure which is not only contrary to the principle of balance -- Mr. Kuznetsov's arguments at our Conference added nothing new on this subject -- but which, moreover, provides only for inadequate control. One of the elements of the "disarmament-control tandem" -- which we regard as fundamental -- is missing from the Soviet proposal, and hence the proposal is doubly unacceptable.

The system of zonal inspection proposed by the Western Powers has been sufficiently explained by the United States delegation, whose arguments I do not wish to repeat. In this connexion, however, it is curious to note that the socialist delegations, while rejecting these arguments, do not agree amongst themselves about their reasons for rejection.

The Soviet delegation described the system as insufficient. I quote from Mr. Zorin's speech at our meeting on 10 August:

"It gives no assurance whatsoever. It creates, I would say, a false illusion that everything is apparently all right, that on the basis of the random sampling method you found everything in that zone as it should be. Therefore, from the point of view of insuring 100 per cent elimination of any particular type of armaments the zonal method does not provide any assurance ..." (ENDC/FV.68, p. 30).

The Polish delegation, on the other hand, apparently regards zonal control as excessive. I quote from Mr. Naszkowski's statement made on 24 August:

(The Chairman, Italy)

"The concept of what is described as zonal control is based on the principle of complete verification extending to the weapons remaining in national arsenals, in other words on the principle of prior control."

(ENDC/PV.74, p.12)

Of course, the socialist delegations are completely at liberty to employ different and even contradictory arguments for rejecting the western proposals. That is their right. We are nevertheless left with the impression that we are faced with a preconceived attitude.

For my part I tend rather to agree with Mr. Zorin: the zonal system involves a certain danger. But the West is ready to run this risk in order to accept the Soviet demand and so that the extent of control should be strictly proportional to the extent of disarmament.

The new western proposals on the zonal system were submitted with the object of seeking a compromise solution, whereas the Soviet delegation adheres to its old proposals without any change.

With regard to item 5(c) which we began to study on 24 August, I reserve the right to speak at a later meeting, after having heard what the Soviet delegation will tell us in reply to the statement of the United States delegation.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have submitted proposals relating to the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) and have given an extensive explanation of these proposals.

We shall of course study the documents which have been submitted and the statements which have been made, and we shall reply to them. I should now like to make a few preliminary remarks.

Judged on a first impression, these documents repeat the already familiar United States proposals on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The first document -- in so far as I have been able to peruse it during today's meeting -- gives grounds for thinking that the proposals of the non-aligned countries are completely rejected in this document. These proposals, which are set out in the eight-nation memorandum, are now not even taken as "one of the bases" for agreement, as the delegations of the United States

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

and the other Western Powers declared in their previous statements. Secondly, it is intended beforehand, as in the case of the United States so-called "new" proposals, to bind the parties to agree to obligatory on-site inspection. We have stated in detail the position of the Soviet Union on this question. I want to reaffirm what has been said by the delegation of the USSR on this subject.

If the United States proposals set out in the draft treaty submitted today really do repeat the so-called "new" proposals, they cannot serve as a basis for agreement.

The second document, as far as I can come to a preliminary conclusion from a rapid perusal of it, is aimed at virtually legalizing underground nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Union stands firmly for putting an end to all nuclear tests, in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water, and underground. If underground tests are not prohibited, the threat of a thermo-nuclear war being unleashed will continue to hang over mankind.

The virtual legalization of underground tests would stimulate a continuation of the nuclear arms race. It would increase the danger to the lives of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people. If we are to approach this question seriously, we must not lose sight of this danger and shut our eyes to it. We must not evade the solution of this question. We are in favour of putting an end to all types of nuclear tests. Where is the way out? we consider that simultaneously with the assumption of an obligation not to conduct tests in the atmosphere, in outer space or underwater, an obligation should also be assumed not to conduct underground nuclear weapon tests. If the Western Powers consider that there is no need to establish any control over the cessation of three types of tests, we agree with that, but at the same time we declare ourselves in favour of assuming an obligation not to conduct underground tests either. We do not decline to carry on negotiations on the subject of what sort of control should be established over these underground tests, although we have a different point of view on this question from that of the Western Powers.

Our position on this question was stated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, on 10 July 1962:

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

"Control over discontinuance of the tests is no longer a problem. In the present state of science all nuclear explosions can be detected by national systems without any particular difficulty. An agreement banning nuclear weapon tests would have been reached long ago had the Western Powers shown in the negotiations even a fraction of the goodwill shown by the Soviet Union." (ENDC/47, p.21)

I think that the members of the Committee are acquainted with the abundant material and facts which have been published on this subject and which confirm over and over again the complete validity of the statement made by the Head of the Soviet Government.

Therefore, we can talk about putting an end to all nuclear testing. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried at today's meeting to ascribe to the Soviet Union the responsibility for the present continuation of the nuclear arms race. Speaking figuratively, this is called in Russian "switching the blame from the guilty to the innocent." It is well known that the Soviet Union was not responsible for starting nuclear tests, and that the Soviet Union is not responsible for their continuation. It is well known that the Soviet Union has made and is still making every possible effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement as quickly as possible, and to put a stop to all nuclear weapons in any environment.

In March 1958, the Soviet Union, wishing to facilitate the preparation of an international agreement on this question, unilaterally stopped testing nuclear weapons, although everyone knew that the Soviet Union had carried out fewer experimental explosions than the United States and the United Kingdom.

What was the answer of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to this? Their answer was a new series of tests of nuclear bombs, which was unprecedented in its intensity. But the Soviet Union continued its policy aimed at the universal and immediate cessation of nuclear tests.

In this connexion I shall recall one more fact. In December 1959, when negotiations were going on in Geneva, the then President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, made an official statement in which he indicated that the United States considered itself free to resume nuclear weapon tests. We say nothing about the fact that while three nuclear Powers were conducting negotiations here in Geneva, a fourth nuclear Power, France, which is a member of NATO, was continuing to conduct nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The Soviet Union, of course is bound to be concerned about its security in view of the actions of the Western Powers, and the threats which are being constantly made against us.

I repeat once more: the Soviet Union is in favour of stopping all tests as quickly as possible.

If the United States and the United Kingdom also really wish for this, why should we not accept the proposals of the eight non-aligned States as the basis for an agreement, since on that basis it would be possible to work out very quickly an agreement on the cessation of all tests -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground? We have repeatedly called and call on the Western Powers to do this.

Now I should like to pass on to the question which is on our agenda for today and to state the views of the Soviet delegation on item 5(c) (ENDC/52).

The Committee has come to the discussion of the next item -- 5(c) in the agreed procedure of work -- proposals concerning the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I. It goes without saying that, as in the consideration of previous items, speakers will have to refer also to other disarmament proposals, since it is impossible to study the question of conventional armaments in isolation. This comes also from the fact that we are still at the very beginning of our work and have not yet reached agreement on what measures should be included in the first stage. In his statement on 24 August the representative of the United States, in connexion with the problem of reducing conventional armaments, touched on the main questions of principle, in regard to which we have already had more than one exchange of views.

What are the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on this question of reducing conventional armaments? We have already explained in detail the aims which the Soviet Government would like to be fulfilled in the first stage, and the measures for their implementation. I will not go into them in detail again. I should only like to emphasize that in our approach to the first stage we differ with the United States on a question of principle. The Soviet Union, taking account of the international situation and the demands of the overwhelming majority of the world's population, proposes that in the very first stage such measures should be carried out as would make nuclear war impossible in practice and would substantially diminish the threat of war in

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

general. Among such measures the Soviet Union includes the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the reduction of all conventional arms by 30 per cent, and a considerable reduction of the level of armed forces.

On the other hand, the proposals put forward in the United States outline (ENDC/30 and Add.1 and 2) do not set in stage 1 the aim of diminishing the threat of a nuclear war. The discussion on disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles has shown that the United States and other Western Powers are unwilling to undertake in the first stage a radical solution of this important, cardinal question, without which it is impossible to talk seriously of eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war which is hanging over the whole of humanity. On this question the Western Powers continue to adhere to their proposals to reduce the means of delivery by 30 per cent in the first stage, leaving 70 per cent of these means of delivery at the disposal of States. Foreign military bases in alien territories are left completely untouched, and so are foreign troops.

This position of the Western Powers cannot fail, of course, to impress a certain character on the whole further course of the negotiations for the purpose of reaching agreement on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and, in particular, on the question of reducing conventional armaments. If we cannot agree on the most important measure of the first stage, then naturally, the final agreement on other specific questions of stage I will also be left to a certain extent in suspense, so to speak. Even if we succeed in reaching agreement on these questions, the implementation of such an agreement will depend on whether it is possible ultimately to find a solution to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I. In this sense we are in agreement with the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Alamayehu, who emphasized at our meeting of 24 August 1962 that we shall never succeed in completing the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament if all substantive points are going to be in single and double brackets (ENDC/PV.74, p. 16).

Nevertheless, we consider it useful to continue our exchange of views on other measures in the first stage, with a view to making efforts to bring the position of the two sides as close together as possible.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

This work may prove to be worthwhile, since the emergence of points of contact in regard to any particular measures will make it easier to agree on a draft treaty in the future, if we finally succeed in convincing our Western colleagues in the Committee to adopt a constructive position on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the Soviet Delegation intends to deal with the measures of stage I relating to conventional armaments.

A comparison of the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of reducing conventional armaments in the first stage shows that, as a result of the flexible attitude of the Soviet Union, certain points of contact between us have emerged.

As you remember, gentlemen, as early as the meeting of the Committee on 16 July the Soviet Delegation stated that the Soviet Government was prepared to accept the proposal of the United States outline for a percentage reduction as a basis for the solution of the question of the method of reducing conventional armaments in the first and subsequent stages (ENDC/PV.57, pp.21-22). The Soviet Delegation then inserted the corresponding amendments in paragraph 3 of article 11 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament dealing with the reduction of conventional armaments in the first stage. This paragraph now reads:

"3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and subsidiary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

"All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities." (ENDC/2, Add.1)

While we accept the United States proposals in the interests of reaching agreement as quickly as possible, at the same time we consider that the proposal providing for the reduction of conventional armaments in each stage in proportion to the reduction of the level of armed forces, would have been better suited to the purposes of general and complete disarmament. However,

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

we met the United States halfway in the expectation that the Western Powers, on their part, would also take steps to bring the positions of the two sides on other questions closer together.

However, as we are now considering the question of the reduction of conventional armaments in the first stage, it is important to ascertain more or less precisely on what points our positions are close together and on what points there is still a divergence. It must be said quite definitely that in our opinion the position of the United States on this issue creates several unnecessary complications. Moreover, in his statement at the last meeting of the Committee Mr. Dean in no way made the task of getting rid of these difficulties any easier.

One of these complications derives from the fact that in the United States plan, as is well known, no distinction is made between nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and conventional armaments. The representatives of the Western Powers have repeatedly stated in the Committee that it is technically difficult, and even impossible, to differentiate between means of delivery and conventional armaments. Mr. Dean repeated these assertions again in his statement of 24 August.

Surely Mr. Dean does not think that he can thus convince the Committee that American military men are not capable of distinguishing conventional armaments from nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, that they cannot, let us say, distinguish an inter-continental missile from a rifle, a long-range bomber from a machine gun, an atomic gun from a pistol, or a submarine equipped with rockets carrying nuclear war-heads from a coastal defence gunboat? I must say we had a higher opinion of the American military specialists.

In these days people have learnt to solve the most difficult problems. Using an electronic microscope scientists can even distinguish molecules, and by means of a radio telescope the galaxies in the endless spaces of the universe. It is possible to distinguish conventional armaments from nuclear weapon delivery vehicles even with the naked eye.

Our military experts consider that there is no difficulty in determining the type of aircraft unsuitable for the combat use of nuclear weapons, such as, for instance, anti-aircraft defence fighter planes, military transport planes, communications aircraft and helicopters and aircraft used for initial

(Mr. Kusnetsov, USSR)

training, irrespective of their airborne weight. In their opinion there is no difficulty in determining conventional weapons for land forces. After all, everybody, even non-military people, know quite well that it is necessary to include among these weapons, for instance, such types of armaments as tanks and self-propelled guns, armoured carriers and armoured cars of all types, artillery unsuitable for firing nuclear shells, such as field guns, anti-aircraft guns, coastal defence artillery and anti-tank guns, mortars and rocket-firing guns of every calibre unsuitable for the combat use of nuclear weapons. Among conventional weapons, and certainly not among nuclear weapons, are to be included all kinds of light firearms including machine guns, automatic rifles, carbines, rifles, pistols and grenade throwers. Surface warships and ships that cannot be adapted for the combat use of nuclear weapons should be regarded as conventional weapons, whereas all submarines without exception can be used for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets and therefore should all be subject to destruction in the first stage.

However, Mr. Dean continues again and again to ask the self-same questions, and when we give him these explanations he pretends that he has not received them.

A typical example of Mr. Dean's attitude is his reaction to our explanations in regard to so-called dual capacity weapons or weapons that can carry both nuclear and conventional charges. On 1 August (ENDC/PV.64) the United States representative asked us whether or not we included such dual capacity weapons among nuclear delivery vehicles. At the meeting of 3 August (ENDC/PV.65) the Soviet delegation gave an affirmative reply to the question and explained in detail why all types of dual capacity weapons should be included in the category of delivery vehicles. Yet at the meeting of 24 August (ENDC/PV.74) Mr. Dean again began asking us in which category dual capacity weapons should be included.

We realize of course that in this case it is not a question of forgetfulness on the part of Mr. Dean but a question of something else. A persistent attempt is being made to impose upon the Committee the idea that for technical reasons it is impossible to eliminate completely all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage but only possible to reduce them by 30 per cent. That is where the dog lies buried, as the popular saying goes. That is why attempts are being made to divert the Committee from the highway into a maze of details of petty technical questions. It is clearly for this reason

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

that the United States delegation is making one attempt after attempt to switch the work of the Committee over to drawing up a list of conventional armaments. Why, it may be asked, do we need this list at the present stage of our negotiations? Is it that you are prepared to agree to the complete elimination of all delivery vehicles in the first stage and to a 30 per cent reduction of conventional weapons only if a list of conventional weapons is put before the Committee? We can truthfully say that this list is sufficiently well known to the American military, just as it is to the Soviet military.

There can be no doubt that if we reach agreement on the main questions, there will be no difficulty in settling all the questions of detail which may arise. The question about the difficulty of determining which are conventional armaments is artificial from beginning to end and, in any case, is not calculated to make it any quicker to bring the positions of the sides closer together on the whole.

We must say, however, that between us and the western Powers there is a real difference of opinion, a real divergence on the question of conventional armaments. We cannot accept the proposal that the 30 per cent reduction in the first stage should not cover all forms and types of conventional armaments, in particular, mortars having a calibre of less than one hundred millimetres, some types of aircraft, ships of a specific tonnage, light arms, and so on.

On 24 August, Mr. Dean said:

"... my Government's position is that during stage I only major armaments and not all armaments should be subject to reduction."

(ENDC/PV.74, p. 49).

By way of argument Mr. Dean said:

"... there is the practical difficulty of making sure that all armaments specified for reduction during the first stage of the treaty do not impose unreasonable burdens on the newly created verification machinery."

(ibid.)

But this is a flimsy and artificial argument. If there is a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it will be necessary to establish an international disarmament organization vested with certain rights and having at its disposal the necessary material resources for the effective verification of disarmament measures. It will be necessary to make provision, and this is quite possible, to enable the organization to control the reduction

of all types of conventional armaments, starting from the first stage. Is it not obvious that for controlling, let us say, the destruction of machine guns practically the same type of control can be used as for controlling the destruction of field guns, while for controlling the elimination of mortars having a calibre of less than 100 mm the same control measures can be used as for controlling the elimination of larger mortars.

Furthermore, we cannot ignore the obvious fact that the retention of a certain portion of conventional armaments will create great difficulties for the States parties to the treaty and for the international disarmament organization.

In the first place, who is going to determine, and how, what are to be considered major types of conventional armaments and what is not to be considered as belonging to the major types? The elaboration and agreement of a list of armaments which are to remain untouched in the first stage is a difficult task. Anyone wishing to do so could easily reduce the whole affair to an endless argument about the list.

Secondly, even if such a list were agreed, in the implementation of such an agreement the international disarmament organization, the plant where verification is to be carried out and the State would be faced with further difficulties of a purely practical nature. It is well known that many plants produce conventional armament of more than one type, but the international disarmament organization would not have the right to control all the types of conventional armaments produced by the plant in question. What would you have the controllers do in such a case? So far, no device has been invented that would select for our eyes only that which we are permitted to look at. This circumstance can always be used, if desired, to complicate the negotiations when we come to elaborating methods of controlling such plants.

Moreover, it would be dangerous to divide conventional armaments, as the United States plan envisages, into two categories, namely conventional armaments which are to be reduced only from the start of stage 2 whereas they are to be left untouched in the first stage, and conventional armaments which are to be reduced in the course of all three stages.

Let us try and imagine what situation would come about in practice, if the United States proposal -- that so-called less effective armaments would not be subject to reduction or to any limitation whatsoever in stage -- were adopted. While peace-loving countries would be honestly fulfilling their obligation to reduce delivery vehicles by 100 per cent and certain types of conventional armaments by 30 per cent, a potential aggressor would be able to switch his military production to the mass production of those planes and warships which are not subject to reduction in the first stage, as well as mortars, machine guns and other types of light arms, and to accumulate them in superior quantities, thereby gaining a military advantage over peace-loving States. In other words, a potential aggressor would be given the "legal" possibility of compensating for the 30 per cent reduction of some types of conventional arms by accumulating other types of armaments of the same category. The history of wars shows unambiguously that, all other things being equal, a superiority even in one type of armament can have a definite influence on the outcome of a war.

We cannot disregard yet another flimsy argument put forward in support of the proposal that not all types of conventional armaments should be reduced in the first stage. As Mr. Dean explained at our meeting of 24 August, the United States envisages, it appears, that "only specified parties to the treaty" would be required to reduce their conventional types of armament in the first stage of disarmament, whereas "some smaller parties to the treaty during stage 1 would be excluded from the requirement to reduce all their major armaments by 30 per cent." (ENDC/PV.74, p. 46)

What is behind this? Why should the United States be so concerned about the smaller countries and how does the United States know that these smaller countries would not wish to reduce their conventional armaments in the first stage? Would it not be better to leave it to the smaller States to decide for themselves what they need to do to ensure their safety and independence?

One thing can be said straightway, namely that in connexion with the reduction of conventional armaments in the first stage it is hardly likely that any difficult problems will arise in regard to the smaller countries. It is obvious that if an exception needs to be made for any of these countries in view, say, of the small number

and deficient equipment of their armed forces, it should be easy to agree to such an exception when we reach agreement on the elimination of the war machine of the most powerful States. One does not have to be a great specialist in disarmament questions to understand that the main thing is not the elimination of the armed forces of such countries as, say, Ceylon or Uruguay, but of the great Powers which have at their disposal the most destructive weapons known in the history of mankind.

We hope that these considerations of ours will be studied by the United States delegation and that it sees its way to review its position and to agree that all types of conventional weapons, without exception, must be reduced in the first stage. The Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament in all stages, including stage I, are in complete accord with point 5 of the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5). The elimination in stage I of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the dismantling of all foreign bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments would ensure that no one State or group of States would be able to gain any military advantage, and that equal security would be ensured for all. At the same time, the proposals set forth in the United States outline do not at all ensure compliance with the basic principle laid down in point 5 of the Agreed Principles. The United States delegation subornly evades explaining how a proper balance in disarmament measures can be secured if foreign bases and foreign troops on alien territories remain completely unaffected during stage I. In stage II, according to the United States plan, there would still only have to be elaborated an agreement on the dismantling of bases, and moreover it is uncertain whether the owners of the bases would agree to their reduction. The same applies to stage III.

We have been waiting a long time for some clarification by the United States on this point.

In this connexion, I consider it necessary to put right the statement made by Mr. Dean on 24 August to the effect that the Soviet delegation had made a mistake and had wrongly interpreted in its statement of 24 August the position of the United States in regard

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

to bases. We wondered whether perhaps the Soviet delegation had really made a mistake and whether perhaps the United States was indeed prepared to dismantle all foreign bases in stage I. If this were so, we would willingly renounce our present interpretation of the United States position.

However, a careful perusal of the documents and statements on this point showed that the Soviet delegation was not wrong when it stated on 24 August:

"... but the refusal to eliminate foreign military bases on alien territory in the first stage or even in the second and third stages of general and complete disarmament completely unmask the United States plan." (ENDC/PV.74, p. 25)

Let us take a look at this plan. There is no mention at all of foreign military bases in stage I of the United States document; they remain unaffected. They are forgotten. In stage II the United States plan envisages the following:

"The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed" -- I emphasize the word "agreed" -- "military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located." (ENDC/30, p. 24)

All that is implied is that in stage II an agreement would be negotiated, but it is not known whether the parties would reach an agreement. Moreover, foreign military bases are not mentioned at all in this document. It is not known, however, what bases are concerned. Foreign military bases remain in the third stage also. This is what is said on this subject in stage III:

"The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens."

(ENDC/30, p. 30)

Apparently, even after the completion of the third stage, foreign military bases would not be completely dismantled. From what I have said it is clear, that on 24 August it was not the Soviet delegation which misinterpreted the position of the United States on the question of foreign military bases.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The reduction of conventional armaments is inextricably linked with reduction of their production. In our draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, reduction of the production of conventional armaments and munitions in the first stage is dealt with in the provisions of article 12. We propose to carry out this reduction primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises are to be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment to be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment converted to peaceful uses. .

This approach makes it possible to reduce substantially in the very first stage the military production capacity of States and, moreover, provides a considerable material gain by adding to the stock of machine tools and equipment used for peaceful production.

Have we any point of contact here with the position of the United States? After a careful study of the amendments to the United States outline relating to the method of reducing armaments production (ENDC/30/Add.1), we consider that there are points of contact on this question, if, of course, we relate the relevant provisions only to conventional armaments and not to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the production of which should be stopped completely in the first stage.

Thus, apparently, we have a common understanding with the United States side that in the first stage there would be allowed only a strictly limited production of conventional armaments required for the replacement of armaments which normally become obsolete each year (apart from the 30 per cent subject to reduction) and that in the second stage it would be necessary to go still further in solving the question. The provision that there should be no re-arming with new types of conventional weapons under the guise of replacement also accords with the position of the Soviet Union. There is no other way of approaching this question. We consider, as does the United States side, that from the very beginning of the first stage the establishment of new plants manufacturing armaments, or an increase in the productive capacity of existing plants of this kind, should not be permitted.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

At the same time we cannot disregard certain inadequacies and ambiguities contained in the relevant paragraphs of the United States outline. Now is one to understand, for example, that in the United States outline nothing is said about the elimination or the transfer to peaceful uses of military plants and their equipment which are subject to reduction in the first stage? How does the United States side intend to deal with these plants?

Equally ambiguous is the reference in the United States proposal that:

"any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that type".

(ENDC/30/Add.1, sub-paragraph (b)).

What do you have in mind here? The adoption of this proposal might be used to replace spare parts of the armaments remaining in the possession of States during the first stage, even by transferring to the military equipment new models of weapons of the same type. This, however, would in no way be in keeping with the interests of the speedy dismantling of the military machines of States in the course of general and complete disarmament.

Thus both on the question of reducing conventional armaments and on the question of reducing their production there are, side by side with definite and fairly significant points of contact, certain differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States. We believe, however, that these differences can be overcome. Agreement on questions of principle will make it much easier to settle particular differences on a mutually acceptable basis.

With regard to control over the reduction of conventional armaments and their production, our proposals in this respect are based on the fundamental aim that the scope of control measures should correspond to the scope and nature of disarmament measures. Accordingly we propose to put under strict international control all measures for the reduction of conventional armaments and their production.

(Mr. Kunznetsov, USSR)

For this purpose States are to submit to the international disarmament organization information regarding the quantities of conventional armaments to be destroyed in the first stage, the places where they are to be destroyed and the location of the plants which are to be eliminated or to reduce their production of this type of armament and the munitions pertaining to it.

Inspectors of the international disarmament organization are to be present at the places where military equipment is to be delivered for destruction. Moreover, they will supervise the actual process of destroying armaments and also observe that what is being scrapped consists of weapons which are serviceable and in good condition and not rejects unsuitable for military use.

Control over the transfer to peaceful uses of means of transport and auxiliary equipment is to be equally thorough.

As regards reduction of the production of conventional armaments in the first stage, inspectors will be able to inspect factories earmarked for destruction, or workshops which are being closed down as a result of the cessation of military production. The inspectors will supervise the dismantling of equipment used exclusively for the production of armaments which are to be reduced and also the transfer to peaceful uses of those workshops and equipment which can be turned over to peaceful production.

In his statement on 24 August Mr. Dean raised the question of setting up a working party on the reduction of conventional armaments. As we know, this is not the first attempt of the Western Powers to set up various types of working parties, technical commission, groups of experts, and so on, right from the very beginning of the work of the Committee, while the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament had still not been agreed. Such an approach would not only be unlikely to facilitate and expedite agreement on the main questions, but would undoubtedly deflect the attention of the Committee from its basic task and lead the negotiations into a deadlock. We must never forget the lesson of the work of committees and sub-committees of the late-lamented League of Nations.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

what would such a working party deal with in a situation where the main questions of principle of the first stage remain unsettled, and there are different approaches to certain important aspects of the problem of reducing conventional weapons?

The solution of the main questions cannot be relegated to auxiliary working parties. If we have so far been unable to agree on questions of principle in the Committee, how can working parties do so? Would these working parties be able to decide, say, the question whether nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be eliminated or reduced by 30 per cent in the first stage; whether foreign military bases should be dismantled simultaneously with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage or whether these bases should be kept until the end of general and complete disarmament; whether or not certain types of conventional armaments should be left untouched in the first stage and whether remaining armaments and armed forces should be verified. All these are fundamental questions, and unless we reach agreement on them the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament cannot move forward and, unless these questions are settled there is nothing for working groups and parties to do. Furthermore, the activities of working groups and parties on conventional armaments might at the present stage create dangerous illusions, suggesting that the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament is making progress, when in fact there is as yet no real progress in our work.

In virtue of these considerations, the Soviet delegation does not deem it possible at present time to agree to the setting up of a working party on conventional armaments, although it bears in mind that at an appropriate stage in the negotiations, when the main, fundamental questions will have been settled, a different situation may come about in which the setting up of such a working party or other working parties would be justified.

In concluding my statement, I should like to point out that the question of reducing conventional armaments in the first stage appears to us to be a relatively simpler and clearer matter.

There can be no doubt that if we are able to reach agreement on the main question for the first stage -- the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles simultaneously with the dismantling of all foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories -- then those partial differences which still exist between us on the question of reducing conventional armaments and their production will be overcome. The Soviet side is prepared to find a way to overcome all differences.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In view of the fact that it is past one o'clock and the Canadian delegation knows that the Committee in general is not anxious to hear long speeches after that hour, I shall try to be very brief. When I inscribed my name on the list of speakers for today I had intended to speak on the subject of item 5(c). However, I shall not do so, but reserve my right to do that at a later time.

The Canadian delegation feels, however, that it could not let this meeting pass without expressing its appreciation for the action of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in tabling the draft treaties which they have laid before us today. They have thereby, we think, taken a step forward towards the agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests which is the strong desire of not only every country represented at this table but, I think, of all the countries of the world. They have taken this step forward, and I should say that they have presented the Conference and their negotiating partners with two alternatives.

The Canadian position on those two alternatives is that we would feel that the only lasting and satisfactory solution would be a ban on tests in all environments such as is provided in the first of the alternative treaties which were laid before us today. However the Canadian delegation is authorized to support a treaty which would limit tests in the environments of the atmosphere, under water and in outer space as provided in the second of the two draft treaties tabled today, and we would hope that that could be negotiated and take effect immediately and would facilitate the negotiation later on of a comprehensive treaty.

We have listened with attention to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union on this matter and we have understood him to say that the Soviet delegation will study the documents which were laid before the Conference and will give a substantive reply at a later date. His remarks today, we understood, were preliminary, and while they were not encouraging we hope that further consideration by him and by his Government will enable the Soviet Union to accept at least one or other of these alternatives. I understood the Soviet representative to say that he was not satisfied with the first of the two alternative proposals in that it required obligatory on-site inspection for a small number of unidentified events which either might be nuclear explosions underground or might be due to natural causes. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation was not satisfied with the second alternative because it did not provide for the exclusion of testing underground.

It would seem to me that the Soviet Union should be prepared to pay -- if it wishes underground testing to be excluded -- the small price of agreeing to a small number of natural investigations on the spot by the central scientific commission in the case of a the relatively few events which cannot be identified as nuclear explosions or as earthquakes. We have heard a great deal of debate in connexion with the memorandum of the eight nations and especially, I think, its paragraph 5 -- whether inspections are to be obligatory or by invitation. I think perhaps the negotiating nuclear Powers here should reflect more on the fact that the rest of the world has been inviting them for a very long time to come to some agreement on the stopping of nuclear tests, and that now the rest of the world feels that an obligation lies upon them to reach that agreement. That will require good will on both sides and some movement on both sides.

We cannot believe that the Soviet Union will insist that this is an "all or nothing" proposition; that all of its positions must be accepted or that the world will have nothing to stand in the way of nuclear tests. We hope that it will be possible for these negotiations to move forward because we have been assured by both the United States and United Kingdom delegations that these are proposals for alternative treaties on which they are willing to negotiate. The Canadian delegation would hope that something could be achieved before we have to take our recess for the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. LALL (India): On behalf of our delegation I would like to welcome the further initiative of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom today in their effort to try to solve the problem created by continuing nuclear weapon tests. We are struck by the fact that in the opening part of his statement Mr. Dean said that his country was acting "in the interest of humanity and of generations as yet unborn", and he further said: "We are trying to stop the destruction of the human race and historical values. If we do not stop testing altogether, we may stop human progress altogether." (supra, p. 5)

We fully agree with those sentiments and I am sure that Mr. Dean, who uttered them himself, will easily see how not only those who sit round this table but those who are not in this room deplore the fact that those governments which can make these statements -- and make them sincerely -- find it necessary, for one reason or another, to act in a manner which is not in conformity with them. Of course, I am addressing these remarks to all those who test, and not to any one country. In short, we see here the recognition of a basis, the basis being that there should be no tests; and we therefore see implied in the words which have been used today by the delegations presenting these documents condemnation of the very actions which are taking place -- that is, testing. As I said, we fully agree with those sentiments, and we trust very much that this renewed initiative will have some effect in bringing an end to nuclear tests. We were glad that Mr. Kuznetsov, at the beginning of his remarks, said that his delegation would study the documents and also the statements which have been made by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom. We hope that that study will lead to further progress.

I should like to explain that the delegation of India maintains the position that all nuclear weapon tests should cease. The Government of India has often stated, through its spokesmen, that all tests, wherever and by whomever conducted, should be brought to an end. That obviously does not mean that we do not favour genuine progress in this field of the cessation of tests.

We were glad to observe that both the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom repeatedly stressed that in presenting a brief alternative treaty to a comprehensive treaty the object was not to stop negotiation on the comprehensive treaty but, on the contrary, to stimulate negotiation on such a treaty. It is on those terms alone that we hope consideration can be given to the briefer treaty. As realistic people, we are well aware of the difficulties which exist at the moment in reaching a comprehensive treaty, although in our view the eight nation memorandum remains a firm and solid basis for reaching agreement on the cessation of all tests.

But we would like to observe that in presenting the second alternative the United States and the United Kingdom have moved forward from the position which the leaders of those two countries took up in their offer of 3 September 1961 when they proposed the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. Today the draft proposes the cessation of tests not only in the atmosphere but in outer space and under water, and we observe that there are no requirements of international verification. We hope that this will be acceptable with the aim of going forward and arriving at a treaty which will put an end to all nuclear weapon tests.

We perfectly understand the difficulty that some countries have in accepting anything like a moratorium. But, trying to think aloud on this important matter -- if I may be pardoned for doing so -- I would emphasize that it might be possible for countries, for governments, to agree to exercise self-restraint in this matter, self-restraint which would bring dividends by increasing confidence and trust on both sides. Is that too much to hope for -- that without fanfare, without any special conditions, the countries concerned could exercise self-restraint in the interests of creating an atmosphere for further negotiations and for bringing to an end all nuclear weapon tests; and also to create an atmosphere which would be beneficial to further agreement on disarmament?

It would be impossible for me to end this statement without saying that the world must be tremendously disappointed at the lack of progress we have made in the field of general and complete disarmament. It must therefore be demanded of us that we should create

(Mr. Lall, India)

an atmosphere for fruitful negotiations in that field. I would submit that even before we disperse for the recess it should be possible to reach agreement on a wide degree of cessation of nuclear tests. I would commend to the nuclear Powers the suggestion -- it is no more than that -- of some form of purely voluntary self-restraint without any conditions, without any limitations being imposed by them, and without their entering into any commitments. I suggest that they should continue their self-restraint, but that it should be still self-restraint, with a view both to taking this matter further in the field of cessation of all nuclear tests and to creating an atmosphere for the long overdue real progress which the world demands in the field of general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): A little while ago I said that the Committee would probably have liked to examine as early as possible and with the greatest care the draft treaties submitted today.

After listening to this morning's statements, I think my interpretation of the Committee's feelings was correct. Accordingly, I think that we may begin to study these new texts at our next meeting. But in my opinion this should not deprive delegations which wish to take a longer time to study the texts in question of the right to speak on item 5(c). We have just heard statements from Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Dean on this item. I should like to ask the Committee if that is its wish and if this proposal is in accordance with its intention.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): According to the procedural document which we have adopted, all delegations are free to speak on any subject of their choice.

We understand that a discussion on the cessation of nuclear tests will take place tomorrow in the Sub-Committee. That, at least, is what we understood earlier on. We think that if it were necessary to put two items on our agenda, we should at least have the verbatim record of the Sub-Committee so that we could speak with more information on this question.

I consider that the Committee ought to continue its discussion as was previously decided, which would, moreover, give other delegations the chance of speaking on other questions.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): Your remarks correspond precisely with what I have just said, but perhaps I have not rightly understood you. Are you opposed to the Committee's discussing on Wednesday the documents we have received this morning?

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I am not opposed to anything. I simply say that our agenda is already fixed and that according to the procedural document which we have adopted any delegation can speak on the subject of its choice.

I should like to stress one point. Tomorrow there will be a discussion in the Sub-Committee on the cessation of nuclear tests. We should like to read the verbatim record so as to be able to speak adequately on the matter.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I cannot quite understand your intention to draw up now the agenda for our next meeting on Wednesday. So far as I understand, it has been agreed that the Committee will now consider the next sub-paragraphs in accordance with the procedure of work agreed between the two co-Chairmen and approved by the Committee (ENDC/52). Moreover, the Committee was informed only last Friday of the agreement between the two co-Chairmen that a meeting of the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests would be called. In this connexion I am in agreement with the views expressed by the representative of Bulgaria. It seems to me that there is at present no need for the Committee to revise the agreed procedure of work for the next few days. Perhaps it will be appropriate if we return to these questions on Wednesday or Thursday, after the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests has met and considered the questions before it and the situation will be clearer in regard to the consideration of these documents. I am therefore in favour of not changing at present the procedure of work which was previously agreed. In my opinion there is no necessity for this now.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): The agenda to which Mr. Kuznetsov refers was drawn up before something which happened today which is in my opinion -- and also if I have rightly understood, is that of other delegations -- of the highest importance. Therefore I think it desirable that the documents submitted to us should be studied as early as possible. We must have said more than a thousand times that the question of nuclear tests was the most urgent of all and that we should try to make progress towards its solution before the recess.

I am therefore at a loss to understand the objection of certain delegations to discussing the texts in question. Naturally I can only follow the wishes of the Committee.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It is, of course, for the Committee to decide which questions it should deal with, but I think that the Chairman simply exceeded his rights, when he raised this question today. The fact is that we have very little time left and we must use it to the utmost in order to reach agreement on those questions on which it is possible to do so. But the approach which today's Chairman is now showing can only give rise to further friction in regard to the procedure. I do not think there is any need for us now to enter into a debate as to whether the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is an important one or not. We have no doubts about that and there is hardly any need for the Chairman to raise this question; but if anything is to be said in this record, then we must say that the most important question, which brooks no delay, is that of reaching agreement to carry out general and complete disarmament, and then all the other questions on which we are now trying to reach agreement may no longer arise. The Soviet delegation does not object to consideration of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, provided it is not to the detriment of our consideration of the problems of general and complete disarmament. As you know, the Committee agreed on this at the very beginning when it was settling its procedure. I cannot understand why it should now be necessary for us to change it at the very last moment. I would

therefore suggest, since we have very little time left, that the co-Chairmen should consult between themselves and with the delegations, say tomorrow, and determine the best way to carry on our work.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I do not disagree with the representative of the Soviet Union, but I do not see that there is really any fundamental difference of opinion between you, Mr. Chairman, and the representative of Bulgaria or the representative of the Soviet Union. In our plan of work it is stated in paragraph 4:

"Nothing contained herein is intended to preclude any delegation from raising and discussing any subject or proposal in any plenary session of the Committee. The present arrangements are not intended to apply to the consideration during plenary sessions of the question of a treaty for banning nuclear weapon tests and of questions relating to the work of the Committee of the Whole." (ENDC/52)

It would seem to me that any representative is perfectly free to go on to discuss general and complete disarmament, or, if it suits his purpose, he can discuss a nuclear test ban. Therefore, I do not see that there is really any difference of opinion between us.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): As Mr. Kuznetsov has alluded to the Chairman's competence, I venture to say that I think that it is part of the Chair's competence to speak about the business of the next meeting. In any case, since the two co-Chairmen will have the opportunity of meeting tomorrow, I think that they will be able to exchange views on the little discussion we have had here today.

M. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I do not think that we should change the order of our agenda because a document has been submitted which some delegations might describe as "very important", "considerable", or even "extraordinary". I would simply like to say that, in view of the provisions on procedure we have adopted, from which the United States representative quoted just now,

"Nothing contained herein is intended to preclude any delegation from raising or discussing any subject or proposal in any plenary session of the Committee",

there is no objection to any delegation speaking on any question it pleases. I think that we are completely in agreement on this point with the United States representative and I do not see why we should change, by another decision, our plan of work for our next meeting. That is why I think we should follow the procedure which we have adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): Naturally, I have no intention of changing the rules of procedure. It is clear that delegations which wish to speak on the text submitted this morning will be able to do so at the next meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-fifth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Soviet Union, Canada and India.

"The delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States tabled jointly two draft treaties: one banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments^{a/}, the other banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water^{b/}.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 29 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

a/ ENDC/58

b/ ENDC/59

